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Introduction
Much has been written on the application of the law of consent to sexual offences,1
the deliberate or reckless transmission of HIV,2 violent or vigorous sexual practices3
and the sport of boxing.4 In attempting to provide a rational or generalised approach
to the law of consent, most of the discussions that focus on the perceived need for
harmonisation marginalise how the law applies to more unusual, and therefore
more conceptually difficult, activities for which consent could be raised as a
defence. As long ago as 1957, Prof Glanville Williams highlighted the root of this
problem when he added his gloss to the aphorism that hard cases make bad law
when he stated that, “cases in which the moral indignation of the judge is aroused
frequently make bad law.”5 With this warning in mind, an analysis of the
conceptually difficult ought to contribute to our understanding of how and why
the law of consent should apply to a wide variety of novel and unusual situations.
The principal focus of this article will be upon an area of activity that has over
the past decade seen a significant amount of growth in popularity, namely, the
infliction of pain and/or injury for the purposes of entertainment, as pioneered by
the US TV series and spin-off films Jackass and widely copied in the United
Kingdom by, for example, Dirty Sanchez and the double act “The Pain Men” on
Channel 4’s programme, Balls of Steel. Until recently, and despite its popularity,
this type of entertainment has attracted minimal comment from academics or
practitioners on the legality of such conduct.6 However, a campaign begun by
1C. Elliot and C. de Than, “A Case for Rational Reconstruction of Consent in Criminal Law” (2007) 70(2) M.L.R.
225.
2M. Weait, “Criminal Law and the Sexual Transmission of HIV: R v Dica”, (2005) 68(1) M.L.R. 121 and
“Knowledge, Autonomy and Consent: R v Konzani” [2005] Crim. L.R. 763; J. Spencer, “Liability for Reckless
Infection” (2004) 154 N.L.J. 384.
3 P. Roberts, “Consent to Injury: How far can you go?” (1997) 113 L.Q.R. 27.
4D. Ormerod and M. Gunn, “The Legality of Boxing” (1995) 15(2) L.S. 181.
5G. Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (New York: Knopf, 1957), p.105.
6For a general discussion on the legality of the issues raised, see K. von Pahlen, “Painful TV” (2011) 9(1) E.S.L.J.
online, available at: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/eslj/issues/volume9/number1/grafvonpahlen [Accessed
January 8, 2012] and K. von Pahlen and K. Oldfield, “No Pain No Gain” Solicitors Journal Online, February 9, 2010
available at: http://www.solicitorsjournal.com/story.asp?sectioncode=3&storycode=15637&c=3&eclipse_action
=getsession [Accessed January 8, 2012].
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Mediawatch7 in 2010 has brought to prominence some interesting and potentially
difficult questions about the ability of a person to consent to injuries caused in the
name of entertainment.
As the parameters of legally valid consent are both unstable and contested,8 it
is unclear whether the types of conduct under discussion here are capable of being
consented to and whether the associated reasons for inflicting the pain and
sometimes injury provide any justification for what might otherwise be criminal
behaviour. In analysing the application of the criminal law to instances of what is
referred to here as “painful entertainment” this article challenges traditional
approaches to the categorisation of consensual activities and proposes a rethinking
of how the law of offences against the person could be applied to novel situations.
The infliction of pain and injury as entertainment
Jackass and Balls of Steel provide two high profile examples of the broadcasting
phenomenon that is “painful entertainment”. An illustration of the kind of conduct
engaged in by painful entertainers, the legality of which might fall within the
unstable and contested part of the law, is “The HumanDartboard” as demonstrated
by “The Pain Men” in Balls of Steel.9 In this example, the two participants agree
that one will throw darts at the other’s bared buttocks; the darts thrown are of the
kind used in the more conventional version of the game with which we are all
familiar. The dart is thrown, hits its target and the “victim” is then asked to rate
the amount of pain caused to them on a scale of 1 to 10. It is apparent that both
participants, and in particular the victim, are giving full, free and informed consent
to the activity; what is about to happen to them is fully explained in advance and
followed by a warning that that the viewers at home should not copy the activity.
The comedic and entertainment purpose of the activity is, perhaps, reinforced by
the “victim” shouting out, “180” when one of the darts hits its target and remains
stuck in his flesh. In another example, the two participants take turns to strike each
other over the head with planks of wood, causing pain and injury, until one of
them concedes defeat.10
Whether or not this is properly regarded as entertainment, the reality is that we
have here one human being stabbing or beating another for the amusement of the
viewers in the live studio audience and at home. Of course, there may be no
intention to cause really serious harm11 and the context and circumstances might
minimise the risk that serious injury will actually result, but the fact remains that
one person is deliberately stabbing or beating another in the certain knowledge
that pain, wounding and some degree of injury will be caused. The question then
is whether it is lawful to deliberately stab or beat another person where the person
stabbed or beaten gives de facto consent and is a willing participant in the activity
7 http://www.mediawatchuk.org.uk/images/stories/newsletter_spring2010.pdf [Accessed January 8, 2012].
8A.P. Simester, J.R. Spencer, G.R. Sullivan and G.J. Virgo, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: Theory and
Doctrine, 4th edn (Oxford: Hart, 2010), p.749.
9 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WFMEBu4bM1Y [Accessed January 8, 2012].
10Other examples include: stapling a piece of paper to the tongue; each holding the head of the other over the spout
of a boiling kettle of water until the pain becomes so intense one is forced to give up; firing an electric shock into the
bared testicles of the other; rubbing raw onion into the eyes and whipping each other with thin metal rods. These
examples, along with many others, are easily accessible on YouTube and reruns of Balls of Steel are currently being
broadcast on Channel 4. See: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QjMOqOzAq4Q [Accessed January 8, 2012]
11At least not in the sense that intention means desire or purpose.
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and where the stabbing or beating is performed for the purpose of public
entertainment?
The current law: how could it apply to painful entertainment?
In the examples given above, it is evident that we have injury and its associated
pain being deliberately and intentionally inflicted. In the “The Human Dartboard”
example, the circumstances reveal potential criminal liability for an offence of
unlawful wounding contrary to s.20 Offences Against the Person Act 1861.12 In
the second example, the circumstances reveal potential liability for an offence of
assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to s.47 Offences Against the Person
Act 1861.13 As the participants in both cases were clearly consenting in fact, it
must now be determined whether that fully, freely given and informed consent is
valid in law.
A crucial feature of any potential offence against the person lies in the
requirement that the injury, whatever level it might be, is unlawful. This, of course,
reveals the essence of the defence of consent. If the conduct said to constitute the
alleged offence is consented to, then the element of unlawfulness is negated and
no criminal liability ensues. But it is well-established that the law will not always
endorse consent as being effective, even if it is fully informed and freely given.
Put another way, a victim’s informed and freely given consent may be ruled
inoperative notwithstanding its genuineness, thus enabling criminal liability to be
imposed on one or more of the parties to the conduct.
In the celebrated case of Brown,14 the majority concluded that consent could not
be used as a defence where actual bodily harm, or more serious injury, had been
intended or caused unless one of a limited number of recognised exceptions applied.
Prior to the decision in Brown, the common law provided piecemeal guidance on
what could or could not be consented to. The courts had expressed the view that
where the activity under scrutiny was not in the public interest, any consent given
could be rendered void. An alternative way of expressing this would be to say that
public policy considerations might render any consent given as ineffective in law.
In Attorney General’s Reference (No.6 of 1980) the Court of Appeal expressed
the view that, “it is not in the public interest that people should try to cause or
should cause to each other actual bodily harm for no good reason”.15 It would,
therefore, seem essential that we have a rational and clear framework for
determining what is a good reason for inflicting harm and which recognises the
activity as being in the public interest. If public policy or public interest
considerations might transformwhat the participants assume to be a lawful activity
into one which is unlawful, then clear principles need to be articulated so that we
have certainty and clarity in how the law will operate in such situations.
Unfortunately, this is not the case. As Allen puts it:
12Assuming that all layers of the skin are pierced as the dart is embedded in the flesh of the victim (Moriarty v
Brooks (1834) 6 Car. & P. 684).
13Bodily harm is any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with the health or comfort of the victim (Miller [1954]
2 Q.B. 282) and the bruising caused by this conduct would clearly satisfy this definition.
14Brown [1993] 2 All E.R. 75.
15Attorney General’s Reference (No.6 of 1980) [1981] Q.B. 715, per Lord Lane C.J. at 719.
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“There is no clear and coherent articulation of fundamental principles which
might govern decisions in new situations nor is there any clear identification
of the public policy considerations which resulted in each decision.”16
Equally unclear is the meaning of the phrase “no good reason”. How and by
whom should the meaning of “good reason” be determined? If, as the courts have
suggested, a good reason can negate criminal liability, then it is not unreasonable
to expect a clear and coherent explanation of what actually constitutes a “good”
reason as opposed to one that will be ignored by the court.
In many cases over the years, the courts have recognised and referred to
numerous activities that may be carried out lawfully without any threat of criminal
liability being incurred. The extent to which these identified activities have been
analysed and referred to varies considerably. It is, however, possible to identify
with some degree of certainty the activities that the courts have determined may
be consented to because they are permitted on the grounds of good reasons and
are therefore lawful, and activities which may not be consented to, have no good
reasons to support them and which are, therefore, criminal.17
As Wilson puts it:
“Clearly there is room, within a reasonably civilised society, for people to
consent to the infliction of injury. Sometimes personal autonomy may be
enhanced by the suffering of injury. Cosmetic surgery is a topical
example…But there is also room for criminalising harm-causing activities,
for example euthanasia, or duelling, or fighting in public, which may harm
public as well as private interests.”18
In striking an appropriate balance between personal autonomy and issues of
public welfare, the authorities are somewhat confused, often vague and certainly
devoid of any consistent and coherent reasoning. This is due, in part at least, to a
tenuous distinction between certain types of activity and their intended and/or
anticipated outcome.
The distinction between injury that is caused intentionally and injury that has
been caused unintentionally seems to have emerged in the decided cases. AsWilson
explains:
“[I]t appears that the public interest test varies according to whether the injury
consented to is inflicted intentionally or unintentionally. If it is inflicted
intentionally, the Attorney-General’s Reference, supported by Brown, tells
us that ‘good reasons’ in support of the activity which produced the injury
must be adduced — a challenging burden. If it is inflicted unintentionally,
Slingsby,Meachen and Dica indicate that the public interest test requires no
good reasons in support of the activity. Rather, it is satisfied as long as no
weighty public policy reasons count against the activity— a less challenging
burden.”19
16M. Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law, 11th edn (Oxford: OUP, 2011), p.367.
17Although the exempted activity might be identified with some measure of certainty, the reasoning underpinning
the exemption is often vague.
18W. Wilson, Criminal Law, 4th edn (London: Pearson, 2011), p.303.
19W. Wilson, Criminal Law, 4th edn (London: Pearson, 2011), p.304.
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Injury caused by activities engaged in purely for entertainment purposes have
not yet been considered by the courts. Despite there being clear evidence that
consent is present, the initial assumption must be that the general rule from Brown
applies and that as there is no specific exception covering “painful entertainment”
it is unlawful unless a convincing analogy can be drawn with one of the existing
exempted activities. At present, the exemptions fall into two categories. First,
where the harm is inflicted intentionally and there are “good reasons” or public
policy justifications for allowing it in certain circumstances; this group is limited
to surgery, body adornment and boxing. Secondly, where the initial contact is
intentionally inflicted and the risk of being caused harm is subjectively run20; this
group includes contact sports, horseplay and dangerous exhibitions. For this latter
group, it is not necessary that “good reasons” must exist in order to give effect to
the consent that is clearly present; instead, the absence of any intention to injure
would suggest that the appropriate approach is to ask whether or not there are
sufficiently strong reasons grounded in public policy to render the consent otiose.
Surgical procedures
It is accepted that surgical procedures are exempted from the narrow rule as
formulated in Brown. The intentional harm or wounding that is inflicted on the
patient by the medical practitioner is exempted on the grounds that its therapeutic
purposes are in the patient’s best interests and are therefore a good reason for
allowing harm to be caused, provided that the patient has provided full, free and
informed consent in advance of the procedure or it was performed out of necessity
in emergency circumstances. Not all surgical, or pseudo-surgical, procedures are
exempted from the normal operation of the law of consent; there must always be
a good reason for inflicting the harm. Thus, Parliament has determined, by its
enactment of the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003, that female circumcision
should be unlawful as the cultural reasons for carrying out the procedure are
outweighed by the unnecessary and often lasting physical and mental suffering
caused to the victim. The lack of any obvious health benefits would seem to indicate
that painful entertainment would not be able to benefit from or draw an analogy
with the exemption granted to surgery.
Boxing
Boxing has long been considered to occupy an anomalous position as far as the
law of consent is concerned as it requires the deliberate infliction of harm on
another person in the name of sport and entertainment.21 Rather than engaging in
themental gymnastics thought to be necessary to provide an intellectually satisfying
justification for the legality of boxing,22 in the context of this article it is perhaps
better simply to state the accepted reasons for the exemption granted to combat
sports. The more detailed explanation is that where boxing and other combat sports
are properly regulated in that they have governing bodies administering the playing
20 Parental chastisement is not included here as it cannot be said that the child victim is consenting to its own
chastisement and is now covered by s.1 Children and Young Persons Act 1933 and s.58 Children Act 2004.
21D. Ormerod and M. Gunn, “The Legality of Boxing” (1995) 15(2) L.S. 181.
22Brown [1994] 1 A.C. 212 at 265, per Lord Mustill.
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and safety rules of a sport that is overseen by a referee and in which the protagonists
are adequately trained and necessary medical assistance is on hand, then injury
can be inflicted deliberately in the name of sport because the risks of harm have
been reduced as much as it is possible to do whilst maintaining the essence of the
test of skill and strength. Alternatively, it is an activity so deeply entrenched in
our sporting and cultural heritage that it is an integral part of our social fabric that
should be tolerated for the time being. Thus, brawling and prize fighting are
unlawful because they lack the appropriate levels of organisation and/or regulation
that can ensure that the level of harm inflicted is kept to the minimum possible.
Whichever of the two justifications is accepted as valid, it is impossible to say that
painful entertainment is either a properly organised, regulated and healthy sporting
activity or so socially and culturally entrenched that it should be exempted from
the normal operation of the law.
Body adornment
The body adornment exemption is wide enough to cover the expected types of
behaviour, such as tattooing and piercing, commonly occurring practices such as
the various forms of cosmetic surgery, as well as conduct at the very extremes of
acceptability, such as the branding of another person.23 The justifications for
exempting these activities are that they protect personal autonomy, by enabling
body adornment or modification where it is desired, and are practices that are to
varying degrees entrenched in and accepted by British culture. Some public policy
limits are placed on tattooing by Parliament, with the Tattooing of Minors Act
1969 ensuring that young people do not get tattooed without understanding fully
the consequences of their behaviour, and analogous activities engaged in for sexual
pleasure are unlawful after Brown. Despite the wide variety of activities covered
by this exemption, painful entertainment cannot be said to be analogous to any of
them; the purpose of painful entertainment is not to adorn or modify one’s body
but to inflict pain or injury for the purposes of amusing the watching public.
Contact sports
The scope and definition of the exemption extended to contact sports is often
misconstrued, leading to confusion about what is consented to and what is merely
risked. This in turn has left the law in a state where the exemption granted to
contact sports does not map on to the offences contained in the Offences Against
the Person Act 1861.24 Where contact sports are concerned, the injury caused to
the participant is usually incidental to the playing of the game, even where the
injury-causing contact is made deliberately, for example, by a tackle in either code
of rugby. Following the clarification of the law in Barnes,25 participants consent
to the contacts expected from and accepted as necessary for the playing of that
particular sport. Where injury is caused, participants voluntarily run the risk that
injury may result from the expected and accepted contacts and from the inherent
23Wilson [1997] Q.B. 47.
24Law Commission Consultation Paper No.139, Consent in the Criminal Law, (London: HMSO, 1995), Pts XII
and XIII.
25Barnes [2004] EWCA Crim 3246.
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dangers of participation in the sport.26 The justification for this exemption is that
sport is socially beneficial because it promotes health, exercise and principles,
such as teamwork and fair play, which are valued by society. Participants do not
consent to injury-causing contacts that are unconnected with the accepted way of
playing the game, such as being punched off-the-ball,27 nor do they consent to
deliberately inflicted harm above and beyond what is necessary for the normal
playing of the game, such as being bitten during the course of a rugby tackle.28 It
is impossible to draw an analogy between painful entertainment and the exemption
for contact sports as the underlying contact, for example being stabbed with a dart
or hit on the head with a piece of wood, does not promote health or exercise, nor
does it promote associated values of sporting conduct. This leaves the initial contact
illegal and the participants lawfully unable to run the risk of injury being caused
to them.
Horseplay
The exception labelled “rough horseplay” is one of the most controversial areas
in the consent debate. It has been severely criticised by many eminent writers29
and yet it is commonly referred to in the cases as an activity where consent is
effective. The exemption has the potential to cover a wide variety of activities
including rough play and initiation activities or dares.30 The question that remains
unanswered by all the authorities, however, is why the law should permit consent
based on participation in “rough horseplay” in the face of what may be
life-threatening injuries and where the genuineness of the victim’s consent may
be somewhat less than apparent. At best, it appears that this category of activity
is exempted because one must expect a bit of rough play in life and that this is a
normal and healthy part of growing up, provided that the injury is not inflicted
intentionally.
Notwithstanding the answer to this difficult question, the continued existence
of this exception is at least partially explicable by recognising that the participants
in “rough horseplay” are, as is the case with participants in contact sports, generally
absent of any intention to cause injury. The participants are instead running the
risk that injury might occur, but that outcome is neither their aim nor their desire.
AsWilson has identified, it appears that as a consequence of this lack of intention,
the public interest approach does not actually require “good reasons” to be present,
but rather requires that there are no weighty public policy reasons that count against
the activity.31 Whether or not such policy reasons exist in respect of “rough
horseplay” may be a matter of continuing debate, but in the case of painful
entertainment, the presence of an intention to injure renders the “rough horseplay”
exception, as currently understood, inappropriate; injury is not being risked from
intentional contacts but is being inflicted deliberately for the purpose of entertaining
others.
26 See further, M. James, Sports Law (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010), Ch.6 and J. Anderson, “No Licence for
Thuggery: Violence, Sport and the Criminal Law” [2008] Crim. L.R. 751.
27Billinghurst [1978] Crim. L.R. 553.
28 Johnson (1986) 8 Cr. App. R. (S) 343.
29 See for example, M. Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law, 11th edn (Oxford: OUP, 2011), p.375.
30 Jones (1986) 83 Cr. App. R. 375, Aitken [1992] 1 W.L.R. 1006 and accepted in Brown [1994] 1 A.C. 212.
31Billinghurst [1978] Crim. L.R. 553.
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Dangerous exhibitions
The exemption granted to dangerous exhibitions is another frequently cited example
of where consent is considered to be effective and yet it is rarely relied upon before
the courts. Further, there appears to be little understanding of its full meaning and
the potential extent of its application. Its validity is referred to in cases and
textbooks with an almost unspoken assumption that the scope of its coverage is,
or at least ought to be, clear. The authorities mention examples of circus acts, like
knife throwing and the human cannonball, as falling within this exemption. But
again, as with contact sports and rough horseplay, the participants in this type of
activity, whatever it might be, are characterised by the common feature that they
are not acting with an intention to cause each other injury. The circus knife-thrower
does not have as his or her purpose the causing of injury, although the risk of such
is obvious to all. The assistant who lights the fuse that fires the cannon that projects
the human cannonball into the air does not aim to cause harm, though there is a
risk that injurymay be caused. The limited discussion of the scope of this exemption
also means that there is no clear justification for its existence. Presumably, activities
of this nature are justified on the grounds that they are exhibitions of skill, in the
case of the knife thrower, and daring, in respect of the human cannon ball, provided
that injury was not inflicted intentionally. For the same reasons identified in relation
to the previous two exemptions, the participants in painful entertainment are
distinguishable from the participants in the activities thought to be covered by the
“dangerous exhibition” exemption on the grounds that the harm caused to them is
inflicted deliberately and without discernable good reason.
Painful entertainment
In the present examples, a certain degree of injury is clearly intended. It follows,
according to the current authorities, that the consent of the participants, in order
to be effective, must be one that is supported by “good reasons”. In general, the
currently identified exempted activities are defined narrowly and appear
inapplicable to the “entertainment” injuries under consideration. Further, this new
category of harm is sufficiently distinct to mean that there are no clear and obvious
analogies that can be drawn with activities that are exempted. Where harm is
intentionally inflicted in the course of surgery (health), tattooing/piercing (culture)
and boxing (sport), “good reasons” have been advanced as a justification. Where
harm is unintentionally inflicted during contact sports (sport/health) or vigorous
sexual activity (choice), there appears to be no significant public policy reasons
operating against their legality.
Thus, it is clear that reasonable surgical interference is permissible,32 as is injury
which arises during the course of properly conducted sporting activities such as
wrestling, judo and rugby football.33 A number of authorities specifically identify
tattooing, body piercing and some forms of ritual circumcision as activities which
might well be receptive to a defence of consent.34 Although something of an
anomaly in terms of logical analysis, properly regulated boxing is also considered
32Attorney-General’s Reference (No.6 of 1980) [1981] 2 All E.R. 1057.
33Barnes [2004] EWCA Crim 3246.
34 See Brown [1993] 2 All E.R. 75, where all these activities are recognised as exemptions.
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to be a lawful activity to which consent operates as a defence.35 Conversely, a
person cannot consent to being killed or run the risk of being killed whilst duelling,36
bare-knuckle prize fighting does not admit consent as a defence,37 nor is consent
a permissible defence to acts of sado-masochistic sexual activity which result in
one or more of the participants suffering actual bodily harm or some greater degree
of injury.38
It seems that painful entertainment is not readily analogous to any of the existing
lawful exemptions. Indeed, painful entertainment appears to have more in common
with activities like sado-masochism and duelling, which are unlawful. It might be
that if an exemption is to be found at all, it could only be explained in the same
way as the anomalous boxing exemption; because society, at present, chooses to
tolerate this kind of activity.
A new approach?
The participants in “The Pain Men” present a somewhat unusual situation that has
not yet presented itself for judicial consideration. The participants are in the
entertainment business; the reason why they do what they do is commercially
driven. The injuries and pain they inflict are integral and central to the
“entertainment”. As we have seen, where injury is intentionally inflicted, there
appears to be two clearly recognised but narrowly defined exemptions. The first
is the sport of boxing which, has itself, been recognised as an anomaly.39 The
second is surgery, be it therapeutic or medicinal, and the related activities that
come under the heading of body adornment. The remaining exemptions identified
by the authorities seem to be confined to activities that carry only the risk or
possibility of injury. The only rational conclusion that can possibly follow, given
the current state of the authorities, is that the intentional infliction of pain and
injury for public entertainment purposes cannot be regarded as lawful.
At present, the restrictive approach determined by Brown, requires that the
activity falls within one of a limited number of narrowly defined specified
exemptions in order that the consent of the participant(s) can be deemed effective.
Would a different approach better reflect and explain the current position and
better enable us to determine in advance whether or not this particular activity (or
any other novel category of activity) would be capable of admitting consent and
therefore of being deemed lawful?
An alternative approach would be to consider whether the activity falls into one
of three broadly defined categories:
Tolerated activities that involve the intentional infliction of harm
This exemption would extend to a consensual activity where harm is intentionally
inflicted for a purpose, or in circumstances that are tolerated by society. The
currently exempted activities of surgery, boxing and body adornment would
therefore remain lawful on the premise that harm intentionally inflicted in these
35 See generally D. Ormerod and M. Gunn, “The Legality of Boxing” (1995) 15 L.S. 181.
36Rice (1803) 3 East 581; Young and Webber (1838) 8 Car. & P. 644.
37Coney (1882) 8 Q.B.D. 534.
38Brown [1993] 2 All E.R. 75.
39Brown [1993] 2 All E.R. 75.
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contexts is tolerated by society because of the inherent benefits associated with
these categories of conduct.
Tolerated activities that carry a risk of the infliction of harm
The second exemption would extend to an activity where consensual participation
carries with it a significant risk of unintended injury, but the activity and
circumstances in which it occurs are tolerated by society. The currently exempted
activities of contact sports and dangerous exhibitions would therefore be lawful
but on the premise that such activities are tolerated by society because of the
inherent benefits associated with these categories of conduct, notwithstanding the
risk of harm associated with participation in them. Rough horseplay could also
fall into this category, however, whether or not the types of conduct that this
exemption has been thought to cover in the past are still considered to be socially
beneficial might be considered to be open to question.
Unlawful activities
It would remain unlawful to inflict harm intentionally, or to take a significant risk
of inflicting harm, where that harm arises in the course of an activity and/or in
circumstances not tolerated by society. Thus, currently identified unlawful activities
such as female circumcision, bare knuckle prize fighting and duelling, would
remain unlawful for as long as society determines that they should not be tolerated
because of the general harm caused to society by participation in them.
This typology has the advantage of relaxing the strictures of the narrow and
rigidly construed categories identified in Brown.40 It would be much more fluid
than has previously been possible, enabling an activity to move between the
categories depending upon society’s attitudes towards it. For example, in 1993
Brown declared that privately conducted consensual acts of homosexual
sado-masochism should be within category 3 and therefore unlawful; however,
should society’s tolerance of such activities change then the flexibility of the
categorisation would permit that activity to be regarded as lawful once society
chooses to tolerate it.
This rebranding of activities based on societal tolerance still carries with it some
difficulties and it is true that this suggested approach remains descriptive of the
outcome; however, it does better enable participants engaging in a novel form of
conduct that has not previously come before the courts to determine in advance
whether or not they are acting unlawfully. In order to achieve this, the definition
of societal tolerance must be clear enough to enable objective decisions to be made
rather than allowing moral outrage to be determinative of the category in which
an activity is placed. This requires a clear understanding of what society, or a
section thereof, means in order for a decision on lawfulness to be genuinely
representative.
An examination of some of these activities reveals that a multiplicity of agencies
currently contributes to the legal outcome. For example, Parliament has decided
that female circumcision should not be tolerated by society and has legislated to
40 For a discussion of this relaxing of attitudes towards Brown, see P. Murphy, “Flogging Live Complainants and
Dead Horses: We May no Longer be in Bondage to Brown” [2011] Crim. L.R. 758.
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render the activity unlawful (category 3). Further, the judiciary have determined
that prize fighting and homosexual sado-masochism are injurious to society, are
not tolerated by it and should be unlawful (category 3). Conversely, the same
agency has decided that regulated combat sports and medicinal surgery are
beneficial to society and should be tolerated (category 1), whilst body adornment
and rough horseplay are not injurious to society and should be lawful (category
2). In the context of the activity under discussion here, the Metropolitan Police
Service, having taken advice from the Crown Prosecution Service, decided that
the legality of painful entertainment was not worthy of further investigation and,
presumably, did not feel that society would regard this kind of activity as
intolerable; therefore, the participants in Balls of Steel were not, in its opinion,
acting unlawfully (category 1), despite there being no good reasons identified in
defence of this position. In each of these examples, the agency concerned is
involved in making a value judgement about the acceptability to society of the
activity under scrutiny.
It is impossible to divorce the effectiveness of consent in criminal law from the
making of a value judgement about the activity concerned, but recognising that
inevitability does not render the proposed approach unworkable. A key difficulty
with the current legal test lies with the wide range of agencies that are involved
in making value judgements about the activities that are being undertaken.41 In
order for this proposal to have any chance of succeeding, one of these agencies
must be given principal control to determine whether or not the injuries were
inflicted during the course of a tolerated activity. This would replace the current
approach where a wide range of interested parties, operating according to different
criteria and for different practical or procedural purposes, apply their own values
on an ad hoc basis when deciding the lawfulness or otherwise of the participants’
conduct. If the criminalisation of consensual risk-taking is an interference with
personal autonomywhose regulation is properly left to Parliament, as was discussed
in Dica,42 then to ensure consistency of approach, Parliament should also take the
lead in defining the circumstances in which society chooses to tolerate the deliberate
infliction of injury, the methodology to be employed in making such determinations
and provide guidelines for those who must take these decisions at the various
stages of the criminal justice process.
Conclusion
Rethinking the application of consent in the manner suggested may not solve the
most difficult problem of all, that of the determination of standards of tolerance
in respect of given activities; it may have to be accepted that this problem is
insoluble. This alternative approach focuses on the true nature of consent as a
defence; the matter is one of policy and it clearly highlights the public interest
issues by asking what it is that society is prepared to tolerate and what it is not. It
is submitted that this proposal does offer a more structured, rational and coherent
approach to consent than does the current ad hoc nature of the law.
41 See, for example, M. Weait, “Dica: knowledge, consent and the transmission of HIV” (2004) 154 N.L.J. 826.
42Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103, where the Court of Appeal stated that the criminalisation of the activity under
scrutiny was properly a matter for Parliament.
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On a strict legal analysis of the present law, the intentional infliction of pain
and bodily injury for purposes of public entertainment is unlawful43; however, by
adopting the approach suggested above, the outcomemight be different. The current
popularity of painful entertainment suggests that the activities engaged in as a part
of these programmes are tolerated by at least a section of society.44 Whether this
is sufficient to declare that the activity is tolerated by society at large, or as a whole,
and that the consent of the parties should operate as an effective defence remains
unanswered.
If the law as it stands cannot deal with new or novel cases, let alone hard ones,
or ones that arouse moral indignation, then it is time to rethink the law in this area
to reflect what society chooses to tolerate, how it reaches that decision and who
is representative of society and therefore in the position to make that decision.
43The anomalous exception of boxing remains.
44Only 43 members of the public complained to OFCOM.
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